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What factors affect health care delivery in the developing world? Anecdotal 
evidence of lives cut tragically short and the loss of productivity due to avoidable 
diseases is an area of salient concern in global health and international development. 
This working paper looks at factual evidence to describe the main challenges facing 
health care delivery in developing countries, including absenteeism, corruption, 
informal payments, and mismanagement. The author concludes that good 
governance is important in ensuring effective health care delivery, and that returns to 
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  2Institutions and governance have emerged as the back bone of development, and are 
increasingly being shown as critical to income levels (Rigobon and Rodrik, 2004; Rodrik, 
Subramanian and Trebbi, 2004; Kaufman and Kraay, 2002), fostering overall 
development (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2005), ensuring sound macroeconomic 
policies (IMF, 1997; Berg, 2005) and per capita income growth (World Bank, 2003b).  
The World Bank’s 2006 World Development Report looks again at the determinants of 
poverty and argues for an emphasis on equal opportunity and the institutional 
infrastructure (World Bank, 2006).  The recent UK government’s Report on the 
Commission for Africa places a premium on governance and institutions as 
complementary to other actions in bolstering development prospects in the region, and 
the US government’s Millennium Challenge Corporation expects to spend billions of 
dollars on countries that demonstrate good governance.  Thus both theory and empirical 
evidence is accumulating to place governance at the center of development thinking, 
spending and action. 
 
At the same time the international community has pledged their support in helping 
countries reach a set of ambitious Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that would 
sharply reduce poverty, raise educational levels and reduce mortality, among other 
achievements.  The combination of the two threads suggests the need to ensure that 
institutional development is fostered in conjunction with efforts to accelerate progress on 
economic and social fronts.   
 
Improving human capital in reaching the MDGs and raising living standards has led to a 
focus on investments in the social sectors, particularly education and health.  These 
sectors received increasing attention and support from the multi-lateral and bi-lateral 
institutions over the past decade (IMF and World Bank, 2005).  Reaching the MDGs in 
health will require adequate funding (United Nations Millennium Project, 2005; 
Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, 2001).  However, it is equally important to 
ensure that health systems function so services can be delivered and health professionals 
be accountable to the public, government and, where they are providing funds, donors.  
The strategy to date emphasizes funding and need, with much less concern for 
effectiveness or, surprisingly, impact, and has largely neglected institutions and 
governance issues.  
 
The problem with the lack of concern for basic governance principles in health care 
delivery is that well-intentioned spending may have no impact.  Priorities cannot be met 
if institutions don’t function and scarce resources are wasted.  Bribes, corrupt officials 
and mis-procurement undermine health care delivery in much the same way they do for 
police services, law courts and customs whose functions become compromised by the 
culture of poor governance and corruption.   
 
This paper examines health systems from the perspective of governance, drawing on the 
knowledge and experience garnered over the past decade at the national and firm levels 
and supplementing that with health-specific evidence.  It therefore examines the 
effectiveness of government and specifically the efficiency of its role in producing health 
care services.   
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The next section outlines the health care markets, the role of government and the 
definition and measurement of governance.  The evidence from developing countries on 
various elements of governance and corruption in health care delivery is then reviewed, 
and the last two sections lay out policy possibilities and implications for the sector. 
 
 
I.  Health Care Markets, Public Health Care Systems and Governance   
 
The growth, governance and corruption literature (Elliott, 1997; Transparency 
International, 2005; World Bank, 1997; Commission for Africa, 2005) largely ignores 
governance when it comes to public policies in the social sectors.  Implicit in that neglect 
is that good intentions surrounding these investments are such that governance is 
secondary, if it has any importance at all.  Efficiency in resource use would suggest the 
need to consider such themes, however. 
 
A.  Characteristics of Health Care Markets  
 
Unlike other goods and services health care services embody some unique characteristics 
stemming from inherent market failures.  First is the asymmetry of information and 
agency challenge of physicians acting as agents for patients.  Patients are aware they 
don’t feel well but they rely on health professionals, often physicians, to act as their 
agents in diagnosing and treating ailments.  Patients are ill-equipped to assess the 
adequacy and quality of physician decisions and actions, and therefore focus on the 
environmental and interpersonal aspects of clinical services, the elements they are best 
able to evaluate.     
 
 Second, adverse selection practices by private health insurers lead to an uninsured 
population disproportionately made up of those most in need of health care: the 
chronically ill, the poor and those having experienced a catastrophic illness.  In settings 
without health insurance ability to pay limits the same groups from obtaining care so the 
same constraints apply.  Government intervention compensates for the market’s 
reluctance to insure the most vulnerable.  And because of the random nature of illness or 
injury, government subsidies protect the population against financial demands of illness.    
 
Finally, the moral hazard of over-consumption by the insured who do not face the true 
cost of health care requires active cost containment, the key issue for OECD countries 
and relevant for development countries as well. A second form of moral hazard is the 
over production of care by physicians when third parties cover costs.  Physician induced 
demand drives costs in much the same way that consumer behavior does, with similar 
implications for payers. 
 
In most countries market failures translate into publicly financed and delivered care, 
and/or regulation from public and private bodies.  Most developing countries depend 
heavily on public intervention rather than regulation, hence the predominance of public 
health care systems in those countries.    
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A limitation in assessing existing health care systems is the lack of any single measure of 
what constitutes a functioning system.  Every OECD country has its own, unique health 
care arrangements with a mix of public and private financing, delivery and regulations.  
OECD comparisons of system performance tend to be limited to gross measures such as 
spending levels or mortality statistics.  The more meaningful comparisons are those based 
on specific diseases where costs, treatment options and outcomes can be compared, 
though countries don’t necessarily collect comparable data limiting the extent of 
meaningful comparisons. For developing countries systems differ and information on 
comparable indicators simply do not yet exist. 
 
These characteristics explain why government’s role is so critical to examine, and why 
the indicators used in this paper for health care delivery are so different from those used 
in other studies of governance or health care delivery.  This effort documents 
“government failure” to live up to the objectives of public policy, looking specifically at 
efficiency enhancement and redistribution, and focusing on incentives as a means to 
improve performance without compromising equity objectives (Jack and Lewis, 2004). 
 
B.  Producing Public Health Care:  a Framework 
 
The production function represents the core of public health care systems embodying 
capital and labor and governance.  A simple representation is the following: 
 
Health Outcomes = (L, K, G)   
 
where governance represents some measure of institutional quality or governance.  
Increases in labor and capital can improve outcomes, but G may dampen or enhance 
these effects. 
 
Labor encompasses management, physicians, nurses, other medical staff.  Capital is made 
up of infrastructure, equipment and other fixed assets, as well as financing:  government 
transfers for local purchase, in-kind provision of drugs and supplies, and third party and 
consumer payments.  The functioning of the public system is determined by the 
incentives facing the actors in the system, the manner in which inputs are managed and 
the accountability imbedded in the incentive structure.   
 
While straightforward in concept, the production function itself is far from simple and the 
market failures identified above plague both private and public systems (i.e., principal 
agent and information asymmetry problems), which undermine incentives and limit the 
extent of accountability.  Accountability can be to a central government, local 
government, communities or patients, or some combination of these. 
 
Measures to assess performance of public systems are lacking.  Infant mortality, a readily 
available and commonly used measure of outcome, better reflects more aggregate 
measures of well being (such as income and education) rather than the health system, 
although once the IMR drops below 25-30  per 1000 it better captures the quality and 
  5extent of medical interventions.  Monitoring basic functions such as hiring, existence of 
appropriate policies, purchase of drugs, building of clinics and procurement practices, can 
be easily accomplished but only represents the identification of inputs.   
 
The more complex and important measures of health system performance are such things 
as staff output, drug and medical supply availability, regularity of funding transfers, state 
of physical infrastructure, inventory and functionality of equipment, and existence of 
patient records, factors which reflect whether health systems are meeting minimal 
efficiency and quality standards.  Utilization data and patient satisfaction offer 
complementary metrics of health system effectiveness since under-utilized public 
facilities or their by-passing by target groups suggest implementation problems.  Despite 
their relevance, such data rarely if ever are collected on a routine basis in developing 
countries.  Indeed such information only exists for a subset of countries and often for 
only a segment of the health system.  In the absence of comparable monitorable 
indicators this kind of information can inform policy makers about performance and the 
pressure points of health systems development before large scale data collection is in 
place. 
 
C.  Governance and Corruption in Health Care Delivery 
 
Health care provision depends on efficiently combining financial resources, human 
resources, and supplies, and delivering services in a timely fashion distributed spatially 
throughout a country.  This requires a “system” that mobilizes and distributes resources, 
processes information and acts upon it, and motivates providers’ appropriate behavior by 
individuals, health care workers, and administrators.  Good governance is a critical factor 
in making such a system function. 
 
In health care, good governance implies that health care systems function effectively and 
with some level of efficiency.  Though many governance indicators have been developed 
for countries in the aggregate, governance indicators for specific sectors, such as health, 
are not readily available.  Consequently, it is necessary to look for proxies that reflect the 
quality of health sector governance.  This paper will focus on one such proxy, evidence 
of corruption, that results when governance is poor.    This section reviews the definition 
of corruption and its application to the health sector.  
 
Sound institutions and good governance go hand-in-hand.  Kaufman and Kraay (2003) 
define good governance as “the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country 
is exercised”.  More specifically it encompasses: 
 
•  capacity of government to formulate and implement sound policies, manage 
resources and provide services efficiently;  
•  the process that allows citizens to select, hold accountable, monitor and replace 
government; and,  
•  the respect of government and citizens for the institutions that govern economic 
and social interaction.  
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(2005) have boiled them down to six dimensions of governance: voice and 
accountability; political stability and lack of violence; government effectiveness; 
regulatory quality; rule of law; and, control of corruption -- all of which affect the 
environment within which health care services function.  The robustness of the private 
sector in health will be affected by factors such as poor regulation or an ineffective court 
system, the elements of particular relevance to service delivery are voice and 
accountability, government effectiveness and control of corruption.   
 
Voice and accountability reflect external accountability, the effectiveness of citizen and 
institutional influences on government action.  While much of the broader concerns are 
with human rights, in health factors such as the viability of the political system, media 
independence and trust in government reflect the degree to which citizens can influence 
government decisions that affect them.  For example, where local leaders are not elected, 
localities cannot hold public servants accountable for their decisions or actions, and 
public bodies have little incentive to effectively serve the community.  The lack of voice 
leaves localities at the mercy of public sector whims.  Voice and accountability permit 
communities to be involved in decisions and oversight of health care services. 
 
Government effectiveness encompasses efficiency of the bureaucracy and public 
servants, roles and responsibilities of local and regional governments, including the 
administrative and technical skills of government, effectiveness of policy and program 
formulation, governing capacity, and effective use of resources.  Extending the example 
above, decentralization that comes without funding or local authority undermines 
potential effectiveness of local jurisdictions as they have no power to affect resource 
allocations or decision-making and can be the victim of “provider capture” where 
centrally deployed staff determine service, organization and delivery.   
 
Control of corruption is straightforward.  It captures the extent and nature of corruption 
among public officials, including tracking the incidence of nepotism, cronyism and bribes 
among civil servants, irregularities in public purchasing and oversight, and the nature and 
extent to which government manages corruption.   
 
Corruption can be defined as “use of public office for private gains” (Bardhan, 1997) or 
“the sale by government officials of government property for personal gain” (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1993).  With either definition good government hinges on the incentives for and 
accountability of public servants. 
 
Forms of corruption vary.  Sparrow (1996) describes the extent of fraud in the US 
Medicare program, which is exacerbated by heavy reliance on electronic payments in 
compensating providers.  Disinterest on the part of law enforcement officials reflects a 
belief that costs appear to outweigh the benefits of investigation and prosecution.  Large 
scale fraud discussed in Sparrow suggests the scope of the possible in developed 
countries where significant resources are devoted to health care; there is heavy reliance 
on automated payment arrangements most of which are never checked by humans; and 
inadequate controls are in place to prevent fraud and abuse.  Similar types of fraud exist 
  7in some middle income countries, but there are far less sophisticated means employed 
with ample benefit in developing countries. 
 
Governance indicators are built on perceptions of in-country and outside observers, and 
their application has emphasized cross-country comparisons.  On the first point, 
perceptions are powerful factors in shaping behavior.  If investors perceive corruption or 
patients perceive poor quality, it discourages private investment or health demand, 
respectively.  But perceptions are only part of what is of interest in assessing governance 
issues in health  
 
Less corrupt and politically stable countries the more attractive they are for private 
investors and donors (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2005).   Good governance has 
been shown to correlate with property rights and civil liberties, and greater foreign 
investment (Hellman et al., 2000), and to “grease” the wheels of government (Kaufmann 
and Wei, 1999). Aid effectiveness also rises in countries with good governance.  These 
clearly have relevance to health care.  
 
Capturing the effectiveness of public health care services, the extent of corruption and the 
degree of accountability pose serious challenges, which contribute to the lagging effort to 
address governance in the sector.  Using national level indicators such as access to health 
services provides limited guidance on how well the sector is performing.  At the same 
time, performance indicators are scarce, and difficult to aggregate where they exist.  The 
heterogeneous nature of health care and the large number of sui generis events; the highly 
variable and unpredictable nature of health care demand; the multiple actors involved in 
ensuring effective service delivery; and, the limited choice of instruments for monitoring 
all contribute to the challenge of defining and measuring governance in the health sector.    
 
D.  Correlates of Poor Governance and Public Health Care across Countries 
 
The evidence on the link between institutions and health has largely relied on analyzing 
the cross-country relationships between corruption and health outcome measures.  With 
evidence for 89 countries for 1985 and 1997 Gupta, Davoodi and Tiongson (2000) show 
corruption indicators (using Kaufman, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón, 1999) negatively 
associated with child and infant mortality, the likelihood of an attended birth, 
immunization coverage and low-birthweight.  The correlation of corruption in explaining 
the same health outcomes is reduced once factors such as mother’s education, public 
health and education spending and urbanization are controlled for, but remains 
significant.   
 
In measuring the impact of corruption on the effectiveness of health spending Rajkumar 
and Swaroop (2002) analyze data for 1990 and 1997 controlling for GDP per capita, 
female educational attainment, ethno-linguistic fractionalization, urbanization among 
other factors, and find that the effectiveness of public health spending in reducing child 
mortality hinges on the integrity rating (1-5 range based on level of perceived 
corruption), with higher integrity associated with reduced mortality.  Poor governance 
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of association between public health expenditures and infant and child mortality. 
 
Wagstaff and Claeson (2005) extend these analyses further and use more recent data.  
They find that spending  reduces under 5 mortality, but only where governance, as 
measured by the World Bank’s CPIA score (Country Policy and Institutional Assessment 
measure that is scored between 1-5 depending on performance, part of which regards 
corruption and governance), is sound (a CPIA above 3.25).  This study specifically 
explores the implications of additional spending for reaching the MDGs, and concludes 
that more spending in medium and low CPIA countries would not be expected to reduce 
child mortality, and that per capita income growth offers a better investment if mortality 
declines are the objective.  
 
Because child mortality rates are measured with substantial error, especially in the 
poorest countries, these results need to be taken with caution. The uncertainty of the 
direction of causality introduces further limitations in the interpretations of the results. 
Cross-country regressions are hard to interpret in any event, but as an aggregate 
assessment they provide general guidance on the relevance of corruption and other 
factors in affecting health outcomes in developing countries.  The inability of country 
level analysis to elucidate specific country problems leads to the subsequent section that 
addresses these issues, complementing this introductory look at the correlates of health 
outcomes. 
 
Figure 1 demonstrates the relationship between governance indices and measures of 
health performance and outcomes.  Measles immunization coverage provides a robust 
measure of public service performance as it reflects government’s ability to perform a 
critical and basic health service.  Measles immunization by itself is particularly important 
since when administered in infancy it sharply reduces all causes of mortality in childhood 
(Koenig et al., 1991; Aaby 1995).  It is also easily measured.  Child mortality is a 
standard variable for measuring health outcomes, is influenced by a wide range of factors 
beyond the quality and extent of health care services, but has the advantage that it is 
available for a large number of countries.  
 
The six panels in Figure 1 show the scatter plots for both indicators and each of the three 
components of the KKM governance index:  government effectiveness, control of 
corruption, and voice and accountability.  Of the three measures, and compared to the 
aggregate governance indicator (not shown), government effectiveness best correlates 
with poor outcomes and performance in health care based on the smaller variation 
conveyed in the adjust R
2.
1  Voice has the least explanatory power and it is especially 
limited for immunization coverage.  The panel on voice and accountability suggests why.  
The highly variable relationship especially among the countries with the lowest 
governance scores makes any effort to explain variation unconvincing.  In higher 
performing countries more convergence occurs for government effectiveness and control 
of corruption but much less so for voice.  Immunization programs are typically the 
                                                 
1 When all three governance measures are jointly regressed on infant mortality and percent measles 
immunization, only government commitment and is significant and consistently shows the expected sign.   
  9responsibility of central governments because it is a preventive measure for which 
demand tends to be low among all but the most educated.
2  The dispersion in the voice 
and accountability panel is consistent with that fact.  
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2 Low demand for immunization occurs in developed countries as well, which accounts for the legal 
requirement in the US that children must be immunized before they enter day care or school.  In the rest of 
the OECD governments take responsibility for ensuring immunization coverage. 
  10 
 
Table 1 provides OLS results showing the strength of governance measures on measles 
immunization coverage controlling for other relevant factors.  Of the various governance 
indices, government effectiveness explains more of the differences in measles 
immunization and has a slightly stronger effect than the overall corruption index, which 
would be expected since immunization is a relatively simple technology and requires 
basic government capacity to do it well. Government effectiveness is consistent in its 
effect on immunization coverage.  Controlling corruption (not shown) is significant but 
less robust than the other two measures, and voice has no effect at all on the percent of  
 
Table 1. OLS results for measles immunization coverage
(% of children ages 12-23 months) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4 (5) )   
Log of GDP per capita, PPP (const 2000 int’l $)  2.351  0.808  0.487  -0.136  -1.378 
 (3.489)  (3.561)  (2.451)  (2.609) (4.212
Aggregate governance     6.152    5.201   
   (3.124)*    (2.442)**
Government effectiveness  7.026    6.812    8.221 
 (3.218)**    (2.345)***    (3.607)**
Average years of schooling of adults, female  1.888  1.763      2.337 
 (0.981)*  (1.008)*      (1.071)**
Primary completion rate, female      0.293  0.309   
     (0.067)***  (0.073)
Ethnolinguistic and religious fractionalization    -6.021    -4.059  -6.671 
   (2.271)**    (2.263)* (2.284)
Road density          -0.037 
         (0.015)**
Constant 56.180  77.120  57.689  66.128  94.809
 (25.664)**  (27.959)***  (17.318)***  (19.704) (33.118)
Observations 71  68  119  112 
  ) 
   
 
 
***   
  *** 
 
 
***  *** 
68 
R-squared 0.434  0.473  0.444  0.470  0.497
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 
Sources: Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005); Barro and Lee (2000); Alesina, et. al. (2003); World Bank World 
Development Indicators 2005; World Bank EdStats. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
   
 
children immunized.  Road density would also be expected to impede immunization 
coverage, which it does, and it is significant.  GDP per capita strongly affects 
immunizations, but not when other controls are added.  Reaching children appears to be 
more of an impediment due to dispersed population or inadequate infrastructure.  Per 
capita income may not be as important to increasing immunization given the generosity 
of donor funds, particularly for vertical programs like immunizations.  The variable for 
women’s education, a key input in whether children get immunized, is best captured by 
average years of schooling for females over age 15.  However, the sample size declines 
by 40 countries when this variable is used, so the completion rate of females, the 
proportion of girls who are currently finishing school, is used as a proxy because girls’ 
  11current achievements are a reflection of their mothers’ support for education and their 
ability to make household decisions about their children’s education .  
 
Table 2 shows the OLS results for child mortality.  The R
2s are almost 50 percent higher 
than those for measles immunization coverage, with income per capita and ethno-
linguistic fractionalization explaining most of the variation.  Average years of female 
schooling doesn’t have an effect, although girls’ completion rates do.  Average years of 
female education becomes significant, however, when ethno-linguistic fragmentation is 
left out, suggesting either some substitution between these factors, or when the loss for so 
many observations affects the relationship.  Governance is not significant, but it matters 
when the education variable is female education rather than completion. Road density 
and urbanization (not shown) have no effect, and that pattern  persists with other models. 
The established inverse relationship between income and child mortality makes these 
results unsurprising, but the lack of importance of female education is odd given the 
strength of the relationship in country level studies. These results provide the point of 
departure for a more narrow focus on both the country level issues and the factors that 
directly influence health care delivery. 
 
Table 2. OLS results for under-5 mortality rate
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Log of GDP per capita, PPP (const 2000 int’l $)  -66.447  -55.263  -29.148  -24.932  -55.649 
  (7.853)*** (9.847)*** (8.403)*** (8.390)*** (9.856)*** 
Aggregate Governance  18.747  16.828    -3.069  18.644 
 (9.167)**  (9.426)*    (7.588 (9.866)*
Government  Effectiveness    -4.773    
    (8.576)    
Average years of schooling of adults, female  -3.819  -3.893      -3.563 
  (2.483) (2.551)     (2.504) 
Primary completion rate, female      -1.261  -1.197   
     (0.194)***  (0.213)
Ethnolinguistic and religious fractionalization    19.222    20.169  18.934 
   (8.220)**    (5.525) (8.155)
Road  density      -0.054 
      (0.073) 
Constant  639.747 521.888 408.635 342.705 526.372 
  (60.938)*** (85.021)*** (60.448)*** (62.343)*** (85.128)*** 
Observations 71  68  119  112  68
)   
***   
***  ** 
 
R-squared  0.748 0.764 0.745 0.769 0.766 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Sources: Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005); Barro and Lee (2000); Alesina, et. al. (2003); World Bank 
World Development Indicators 2005; World Bank EdStats. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
   
 
The next section summarizes accumulated evidence on specific components of  
governance and corruption, including:  perceptions of corruption and performance; 
management challenges in public systems; staff absenteeism; under-the-table or informal 
payments for health services; corrupt practices including misuse of public funds, 
  12irregularities in contracting and purchasing supplies, petty theft and the selling of 
positions and promotions.  As symptoms of poor performance, they provide an empirical 
base for exploring priority areas for attention and intervention. 
 
 
II.  Government Effectiveness, Corruption and Accountability in Health Care 
Delivery 
 
Separating three components of governance – government effectiveness, corruption and 
accountability -- allows targeting policies to specific shortcomings.  However, the 
information base is thin and the elements so intertwined that a separate analysis of each 
yields little benefit.  For example, evidence from provider and other surveys in 
Mozambique, Nigeria and Uganda suggest that the level of mismanagement, 
vague and poorly understood performance expectations and the singular lack of 
accountability to anyone or any institution makes haphazard and corrupt practices 
difficult to identify, separate or control ( Lindelow, Ward and Zorzi,  2004; Lindelow, 
Reinikka and Svensson, 2003; Das Gupta, Gauri and Khemani, 2003; McPake et. al., 
1999).    
There is a fine line between inefficiency and corruption in many instances.  Is poor 
service a function of corruption or simply mismanagement?  Better accountability can 
address both, so should the approach be combined or separated?  In the interests of 
clarity, this section will discuss governance, corruption and accountability jointly 
reviewing the evidence and offering an interpretation of those findings as they relate to 
each of these criteria.   
This discussion begins with an assessment of perceptions of corruption in select countries 
to provide that context.  It then addresses the production function elements in reviewing 
country level evidence.  The analysis tracks productivity of labor, and capital inputs:  
drugs, supplies and national transfers, complementing these with a brief assessment of 
management, a central component for correcting many of the problems identified.   
 
A.   Perceptions of Corruption in Public Health Care Systems 
 
While not strictly part of the production function, perceptions about corruption reflect 
how stakeholders view health systems and their effectiveness in producing acceptable 
health outcomes.  Perceptions provide the basis for assessing governance at a national 
level, and similar estimates have been collected for the health sector in a subset of 
countries. Extensive, cross-country surveys of public officials, the business community 
and the general public gauge perceptions of corruption in public service.  At a sectoral 
level a number of recent perception surveys of medical personnel in Latin American 
public hospitals provide a sense of the kinds and frequency of corruption in facilities as 
well as the likely perpetrators by profession (Di Tella and Savedoff, 2001).  Both types of 
surveys indicate corrupt practices, which by their nature are not typically visible.  
Perceptions may be the only alternative in instances where hard data are either 
unobtainable or unreliable, and corruption in general does not lend itself to 
straightforward data collection.    
 
  13Figure 2 summarizes the perceptions of the general population toward corruption in 
health in a selection of countries for which data are available. Data come from various 
sources all largely based on perceptions and they are not strictly comparable though they 
suggest general levels of corruption in the included countries. Coverage is uneven with a 
bias towards the countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ECA) and South Asia 
where data are more plentiful.  Of those at or above 60 percent of the population 
perceiving corruption in the health sector half are ECA countries, results partly due to the 
disproportionate number of ECA countries. 
 
In corruption surveys interviewing public officials, business executives and the general 
public in 23 countries, health ranked first as the most corrupt sector in Moldova, Slovakia 
and Tajikistan, second in Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka, and in the top four in 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Madagascar and Morocco.  For the most part these 
countries also ranked highly on the percent of the population perceiving high levels of 
corruption in health – going as high as 95% in Pakistan, 92% in Sri Lanka, 85% in 
Tajikistan, 82% in Moldova and 80% in Morocco.
3  Expectations on paying for public 
care correspond to the perceptions of corruption, which in turn are closely related to the 
need for informal payments, as will be discussed below. 
  
A related 2001 perceptions survey conducted by USAID on corruption among public 
officials in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Romania, Croatia, and 
Montenegro showed that 45-55% of respondents felt that corruption among doctors was 
widespread.  Albania and Serbia showed much higher levels -- 61-71% range.  Albania’s 
perception score for doctors was an outlier relative to its score for other public officials, 
but Serbia exhibited levels above those of other countries for most categories of officials, 
suggesting a relatively more corrupt environment (Vitosha/USAID, 2002). 
 
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys of administrative corruption 
in ECA capture business managers’ perceptions of health service quality.  Across 20 
countries only Slovenia and Czech Republic had positive assessments from 60% or more 
of respondents, indicating management and governance problems in the other 18 systems 
(Ryterman, Hellman, Jones et al., 2000). 
 
In Bolivia a local survey of patients considered the Health Ministry and public hospitals 
less corrupt than customs or police, but ranked corruption 2.7 on a scale of 1-4, noting the 
nepotism, clientelism and higher charges for the unconnected as some key indicators of 
corruption (Gatti, Gray-Molina and Klugman, 2004), evidence that has been corroborated 
in other studies as discussed below.  Surveys from South Asia suggest similar perceptions 




                                                 
3 It is counter-intuitive that only 15% of the Indian public and 9% of the Kazak public perceive corruption 
in the health sector when they ranked it so highly on perceptions of corruption in the sector.  This bears 
further investigation. 
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  15A comparison of corruption perceptions among households in the Philippines and 
Uganda found 34 and 71 percent, respectively, reported that corruption is common or 
very common in government generally.  And among local officials, 25 percent in the  
Philippines and 61 percent in Uganda acknowledged some kind of corruption in public 
services within the municipalities (Azfar and Gurgur, 2001).  
 
Explanations from the surveyed on why corruption is so evident in the health sector 
emphasize the lack of accountability and transparency in health care operations, and in 
some the “power of monopoly” where other public or private alternatives simply do not 
exist (Thampi, 2002; McPake et. al 1999; Lewis, 2000, 2002; Narayan, 2000).  While not 
definitive, perceptions highlight where abuses are assumed and widespread and they have 
become reliable indicators of corruption.  Only a few countries have sector specific data 
on perceptions.  Greater efforts to track such information can guide both policymakers 
and donors providing a benchmark for individual countries.   
 
B.  Staffing Health Care Delivery 
 
Staffing is arguably the single most important element of health care delivery as little can 
be achieved without it.  Training of the staff, their competencies and ability to function 
all determine whether labor can drive the expected results.  Training typically is adequate 
if not well beyond that needed in the lowest income countries, especially for physicians.  
Availability of the full range of competencies, however, often lags with particular 
inattention to management needs, and lower paid staff with minimal skills can proliferate.  
 
Among the most serious issues in developing countries is the high rate of absenteeism, 
which undermines service delivery and leads to closed public clinics that compromise the 
equity and health objectives of publicly financed health care.  Two other commonly 
observed constraints include low productivity of public medical staff, and the outright 
corruption that underlies the buying and selling of official positions.  Capturing low 
productivity and poor service poses greater difficulties; absenteeism already reflects 
reduced output, and underperformance.  Patient satisfaction provides an additional 
window into adequacy of staff services. 
 
Absenteeism.  Absenteeism poses a chronic, but often unmeasured, problem in publicly 
financed health care, and can severely limit patient access to services (McPake et. al., 
1999; Lewis, Eskeland and Traa-Valarezo, 2004; Narayan, 2000), reduce quality 
(McPake et. al., 1999; Lewis, La Forgia and Sulvetta, 1996), and suggest corruption 
(DiTella and Savedoff, 2001).   
Absenteeism occurs for various reasons, many of them legitimate or necessary.  For 
example, rural health workers often need to travel to larger towns to receive their 
paycheck, fetch supplies or drugs or are delayed by poor infrastructure or weather.  All 
lead to absences but are necessitated by inadequate management or other shortcoming of 
the country context.  On the other hand, some staff have other commitments or 
preferences and don’t show up.  In effect they receive a salary but provide minimal if any 
services.  This is effectively theft, a form of “public office for private gain.” 
  16Capturing the extent of absenteeism among public service staff is made difficult by the 
lack of or incomplete nature of staff attendance records.   Various alternatives have been 
applied to examine the issue including perceptions of other providers (DiTella and 
Savedoff, 2001).   
Figure 3 compares absenteeism rates for studies that report such data, and measurements 
vary, as do level of provider, number of observations within each provider unit and 
location.  Chaudhury, et al., (2004) use a single surprise visit to a nationally 
representative sample of rural clinics in 5 countries; Banerjee, Deaton and Duflo (2004) 
tracked absences in 143 government facilities in Udaipar district in Rajasthan, India 
based on weekly visits over 18 months; Lewis, LaForgia and Sulvetta (1996) used time 
and motion studies during a two weeks period to track health provider attendance in a 
single hospital in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic; and, McPake et al. (1999) 
directly observed clinics in 10 rural districts in Uganda over the course of  one week.  
Thus the reported absences are captured using different time frames, samples and 
providers.   
Absenteeism rates, measured in these particular studies, range from a low in Mozambique 
and Papua New Guinea of 19 percent to over 60 percent among physicians in a 
Dominican hospital, in rural Bangladesh and Uganda, but cluster around 35-40 percent 
for the others.  These results suggest a serious gap in health service coverage due to 
absent staff, levels considerably above those from similar studies in the same countries 
for teachers (Chaudhury et al., 2004).  As in Figure 2, these results rely on different types 
of surveys over varying time periods and for a variety of services.  What is noteworthy 
are the range of methods, the lack of consistency and the need to establish acceptable and 
regular means for tracking staff absenteeism.  Otherwise it will remain an ad hoc 














0 1 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0 1 0 0
*Udaipur district, Rajasthan, India.  **Santo Dominigo hospital, Dominican Republic
















  17approach.  
 Lewis, La Forgia and Sulvetta’s (1992; 1996) time and motion studies in inpatient, 
outpatient, surgery and emergency found that not only did physicians only provide 12% 
of contracted time, nurses provided virtually no care outside of inpatient services, and 
staff physicians, residents and interns provided only 7, 4, and 8 percent of their 
contracted time, respectively.  As found in Uganda (see below), absenteeism was lowest 
during the early morning hours and in the outpatient department.  In the DR, surgery was 
only conducted before noon during the availability of surgeons, leaving the facility idle 
for the remainder of the 24 hour day.  Interns, residents and auxiliary nurses received 
virtually no supervision from staff physicians and nurses.  The resulting services were 
under-staffed and reliant on untrained providers with virtually no supervision.  The 
abuses translated into high costs for the public sector with little output, and undermined 
the quality of health care across the board by relying on ill-trained providers for care and 
under investing in the quality of future providers. 
 
Residents and auxiliary nurses received virtually no supervision from staff physicians and 
nurses.  The resulting services were under-staffed and reliant on untrained providers with 
virtually no supervision.  The abuses translated into high costs for the public sector with 
little output, and undermined the quality of health care across the board by relying on ill-
trained providers for care and under investing in the quality of future providers.  
 
McPake et al., (1999) recorded attendance and clinic openings.  Clinics only remained 
open for 2-3 hours in the morning with partial coverage by health staff, often on a 
rotating basis.  Doctors, medical assistance, midwives and nurses were available for an 
average of 12.9 hours per week while nursing aides, dressers and pharmacy orderlies 
worked an average of 18.5 hours.  The latter group of lower level health workers 
provided 71 percent of total available hours of staff at the clinics compromising quality as 
well as coverage.  These estimates ignore the “ghost” workers who never attend the 
facility, suggesting that the average attendance of contracted staff is even lower than the 
estimates.   
 
Chaudhury and Hammer’s (2004) study of absenteeism in rural health clinics in 
Bangladesh recorded availability of doctors and paramedics of filled positions.
4  On 
average 35% of staff and 42% of physicians were absent across the 60 clinics visited.  In 
eamining clinics by location, absenteeism in the most rural areas was 74% for doctors.  
Subsequent multivariate analysis showed that living outside the service village, being 
female and poor road access increased the likelihood of absenteeism among physicians.  
Absenteeism was associated with clinics in disrepair as well as with lower patient 
demand, suggesting that absenteeism compromises quality and quantity of services. 
                                                 
4 They found that 26% of positions and 41% of physicians slots were vacant, suggesting that the total 
available stock was already below what was demographically required and budgeted.  
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The studies in Uganda and Rajasthan, India added a search for absent primary health care 
workers.  Over the course of 18 months Indian nurses were only to be found in villages 
served by the subcenter 12 percent of the time, and all were assigned to staff the clinic on 
a regular basis.  The pattern of absences, and therefore closure of facilities, followed no 
pattern meaning that patients’ likelihood of finding a provider was unpredictable 
(Banerjee, Deaton and Duflo, 2004).  Health workers were often found at home in 
Uganda, although some employees simply never attended the facility and were 
designated as “ghost” workers (McPake et al., 1999).  The costs represented by absent 
staff are not insignificant given the higher levels absenteeism, which are consistently 
higher than those found in education. 
Absenteeism based on perceptions provide some orders of magnitude of nonattendance, 
but may be less objective than the recorded observations or surprise visits discussed 
above. Nonetheless they are instructive. 
Absenteeism is considered the most serious corruption problem in Colombia, but 
perception of absenteeism varies across the six Latin American countries for which 
qualitative survey data are available (Giedion, Morales and Acosta, 2001).  Surveys of 
hospital nurses’ perceptions of the frequency of chronic absenteeism among doctors 
reported rates of 98% in Costa Rica, 30% in Nicaragua, 38% in Colombia (Giedion, 
Morales and Acosta, 2001) and between 24-31% across public and social security 
hospitals in Argentina (Schargrodsky, Mera and Weinschelbaum, 2001).  In Peru 
estimates of hours absent from work ranged from 12 to 36 hours (Alcázar and Andrade, 
2001) across the sampled hospitals.   
Shaving off hours is more commonly reported than absent days in all the Latin American 
country surveys.  Late arrival and early departure only represented 2- 23 percent of all 
absences in a four country study (Uganda, Bangladesh, India and Indonesia) of medical 
personnel based on surprise visits (Chaudhury, et al, 2004).  The Colombia case study 
above estimated that the cost of the lost time in the public hospitals of Bogotá was 
equivalent to over US$1 million per year.   
Focus groups in Ethiopia among health workers revealed common understaffing due to 
late arrivals, long breaks and a general disregard for the necessity of staffing clinics. 
Absences are frequently motivated by responsibilities at second jobs. Lack of 
management and manager’s reluctance to confront physicians inspires lower level 
workers to behave accordingly, leading to high absenteeism and low productivity at all 
levels. (Lindelow, Serneels and Lemma, 2003) 
 
Where absenteeism is endemic, as was the case in Uganda, Rajasthan India and the 
Dominican Republic, such explanations are far less compelling.  One factor shared by all 
of the examples above is that absent health workers face almost no consequences.  There 
is no accountability for public servants.  Without accountability, abuses are more likely to 
proliferate and eventually undermine the health care system. 
 
Multivariate evidence for education provides some important insights.  The correlates of 
teacher absences in five countries produced mixed findings but in at least three countries 
infrastructure quality mattered consistently, and, in some, Ministry of Education inspections were also associated with lower absenteeism.  Education of mothers, 
community oversight, location of schools and the training of teachers, had perverse or 
insignificant effects on absenteeism.  To the extent that inspectors were indeed a tool of 
accountability, they had some effect in Ecuador, India and Indonesia but no effect at all 
in Peru and Uganda.  The consequences of high absenteeism were not discussed nor were 
any other forms of accountability (Chaudhury et al, 2004). 
 
Absenteeism is symptomatic of an unaccountable and ineffective government, and leads 
to contempt for government, its policies and practices, and compromises both access to 
and quality of health care services.  Unproductive or absent workers who do not receive 
any punishment for substandard performance and whose promotion and pay remain the 
same as those with better performance, undermine morale and reduce output, which in 
turn leads to a spiral of overall poor performance.  Accountability is meaningless or 
doesn’t exist without sanctions, and institutions suffer accordingly.     
 
Purchasing Public Positions.  The insidious practices of selling public positions and 
requiring bribes for promotion fundamentally undermine good performance and builds a 
corruption spiral since the newly hired and promoted must find the resources to ensure 
their continued employment and advancement.  The practice has been documented for 
much of Eastern Europe and Central Asia where the breakdown of government led to the 
commercialization of public positions (Kaufman, Pradhan and Ryterman, 1988).  
Outright purchase of public employment through bribes is often anecdotally accepted, but 
some recent work has tried to quantify it.  Evidence from surveys of public officials in 
Latvia, Armenia and Georgia showed that the “cost” of public positions was well known 
among public officials and the general public.  Interestingly the higher cost jobs were in 
the most corrupt enclaves of government (Kaufman, Pradhan and Ryterman, 1988).   
 
In Bosnia and Herzegovina bribes were particularly common in the health sector with 
surveys of officials and citizens reporting that 75 percent thought bribes were required for 
obtaining positions and for promotion (World Bank, 2001e).  In Ghana 25% of jobs were 
allegedly bought in government hospitals.  In Uganda 20 percent of municipal officials 
acknowledged that the practice occurred in the health sector, and in the Philippines 3 
percent noted it (Azfar, Kahkonen and Meagher, 2001). 
 
In focus groups in Ethiopia health officials complained about unfair hiring practices, 
nepotism and preferential treatment to well connected individuals.  Similarly in the 
Dominican Republic “patronage propelled personnel rolls” leading to one of the highest 
rates of health personnel to population in the region.  Promotions routinely rely on 
recommendations from politicians, and military authorities that lead to a mismatch 
between skills and needs (La Forgia et al, 2004). An earlier study found that most care 
was already provided by under-trained medical students operating on patients without 
supervision (Lewis, La Forgia and Sulvetta, 1992).  
 
Staff accountability for misconduct is rare.  Its absence in accountability is noted for the 
Dominican Republic (La Forgia et al, 2004), although Cohen (2002) reports that in Costa 
Rica 27 percent of users know of a case where sanctions were imposed or a public 
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least egregious misconduct is disciplined. 
 
Collusion among public officials has also been identified as perpetuating corruption.  In 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (World Bank, 2001e) 35 percent of officials said health 
colleagues who refuse bribes face retribution, and similar views were expressed in focus 
group discussions among public health staff in Ethiopia.   
 
C.  Supplies:  Mismanagement and Corruption 
 
Availability of drugs and supplies complement health professionals and their absence 
reflect poor management or corruption.   
 
Drug Management and Leakage.  Virtually all qualitative studies that have probed this 
issue have emerged with the view that quality and drug availability are virtually 
synonymous, and lack of drugs has been repeatedly shown to discourage utilization of 
public facilities (World Bank, 2005a).  A recent in depth assessment of the Costa Rican 
pharmaceutical system’s registration, drug selection, procurement, distribution and 
service delivery revealed both great strengths and glaring weaknesses.  The study used a 
combination of (i) interviews with public officials; (ii) industry interviews with local 
pharmacies and multinational companies; (iii) focus groups with health care 
professionals; and, (iv) exit surveys for a representative sample of patients. 
 
Clear publicly available procedures, pharmaceutical lists and criteria; reliance on defined, 
generic drugs; and distribution audits were deemed excellent.   The greatest weaknesses 
were in procurement, specifically in the lack of performance monitoring, quality 
monitoring, audits and uncontrolled political interference; and in distribution where 
inventory management, security and information systems were found particularly 
deficient.  Alleged abuses in service delivery by both health professionals and patients 
were attributed to lack of controls in prescribing and supplying drugs to patients. 
 
Surprisingly, half of exit survey respondents had not received a prescribed drug due to 
non-availability, an important indicator of ineffectiveness (Cohen, 2002).  Costa Rica’s 
strong record in health care delivery and its relatively higher income, greater health 
spending and education levels among developing countries suggests the difficulty and 
challenges inherent in managing health systems and drugs in particular.  
 
Drugs tend to be a commonly “leaked” product given that it can fetch a higher price in 
the private market.  In Ethiopia users and providers explained in focus groups the 
rampant stealing of public sector drugs, their resale in the private market and the common 
dealings in contraband medicines.  They acknowledge the lack of drugs in the public 
sector and the ready availability of those drugs in private pharmacies and clinics.  A 
health officer in Addis Ababa noted that “most health workers are involved in such things 
[theft]” attributing this to “outside temptations” and low pay of public servants 
(Lindelow, Serneels and Lemma, 2003).  Surveys in Nigeria found that 28 PHC facilities 
had not received drugs from the federal government in two years, and a World Bank 
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supplied drug stock in 2001 (Adeniyi, 2001).  In Costa Rica 32 percent of users indicated 
that they had prior knowledge of theft in government pharmacies (Cohen, 2002), and in a 
hospital study in the Dominican Republic comparing patient prescriptions and records of 
administered drugs a significant proportion of drugs went missing. 
 
The average leakage rate for drugs in Uganda was estimated at 73%, ranging from 40 to 
94% across 10 public facilities.  High demand drugs, such as those to treat malaria, were 
the least available to patients because health workers and the Health Unit Management 
Committee members, the entities meant to provide local oversight, expropriated them 
(McPake et al, 1999).  A later facility exit survey in Uganda shows much higher drug 
availability and distribution, however (Lindelow, Reinikka and Svensson, 2003).  In 
China various studies indicate that on average about 30 percent of public drug supplies 
are expired or counterfeit (Hsiao, 2005), suggesting poor logistics management, limited 
oversight and graft. 
 
More insidious and difficult is drug mishandling from the importation of substandard 
medications, to the repackaging of drugs, substituting lower cost/quality medications, to 
the pilfering of drug supplies at points of service (e.g., clinics and hospitals).  The health 
consequences of tampering can be serious, but rarely traced to the source of the problem 
due to ignorance, lack of regulation and enforcement.     
 
In-kind Supplies from Patients.   Interviews and focus groups from around the world 
reveal the common need to either bring or purchase basic supplies (e.g., bed sheets, 
bandages) or drugs (Narayan, 2000; Lewis, 2000, 2002) and in some instances 
equipment.  The concentration of private health services adjacent to public hospitals and 
clinics in many countries attests to the chronic shortages of basic inputs and 
malfunctioning equipment.  In Kyrgyz Republic in 2001 among hospitalized patients 98 
percent brought food, 73 percent linens, 80 percent had family members purchase drugs 
and 76 percent supplied medical supplies (Falkingham, 2002).  Similarly in Tajikistan in 
1999 77 percent spent on food, 93 percent on medicines and 51 percent for medical 
supplies (Falkingham, 2004).  Thus the health care system supplied little of the operating 
inputs in either country.  Patients paid for 50 percent of drugs in the Dominican Republic 
hospital (Lewis, LaForgia and Sulvetta, 1996). 
 
In Nigeria 25% of health facilities had about half of the minimum package of equipment, 
while 40% had less than a quarter of what was needed (World Bank, forthcoming).  In 
Ethiopia two separate surveys revealed that only 21 percent of public hospitals had 
autoclaves (sterilizers) and 46 percent had functioning operating theaters, both serous 
shortcomings given the spreading AIDS epidemic and the high volume of patients (World 
Bank, 2005b).  A study in Udaipur district in Rajasthan, India found patchy availability 
of basic equipment in health facilities with only a quarter having sterilizers.  A third of 
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Graft and padding of billings form a commonly identified form of corruption in the 
public sector, and health care is no exception.  The constant need for supplies to 
complement the skills and infrastructure investments of government offer an opportunity 
for petty theft.   
 
Siphoning of public funds for private gain can occur in the transfer of funds from public 
treasuries to ministries of health, from the ministries to their provider units, and within 
the provider units themselves.  All of these levels provide opportunity for theft.   Misuse 
of funds often occurs in the process of tendering and payment, something all countries 
need to guard against through required procedures and regular audits.  Having clearly 
articulated policies and procedures, adherence to policies and regulations, and consistent 
enforcement of rules discourage illegal behaviors. 
 
In a 4 province survey across 80 municipalities in the Philippines corruption perceptions 
of households was negatively associated with providers’ knowledge (of required 
immunizations), which in turn was strongly related to immunization coverage and disease 
incidence in the survey areas. Although significance is not highly robust in all cases, the 
analysis illuminates the negative relationship between corruption and performance at the 
local level (Azfar, Kahkonen and Meagher, 2001).   
 
The contracting process for construction and the purchase of supplies offers a 
traditionally rich source of returns for corrupt officials and suppliers through kickbacks, 
over-invoicing or outright graft.  A recent study of 7 Latin American countries provides 
insights on overpayment for supplies (DiTella and Savedoff, 2001).    
 
In Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia and Venezuela overpayment for supplies in public 
hospitals points to corruption.  Perceptions of staff, their assessment of the probabilities 
of getting caught and being punished, and examination of hospital records and comparing 
these with market prices suggest that irregularities are rife.  Figure 4 shows the ratio of 
highest to lowest purchase price for four commonly stocked medical supplies – saline 
solution, cotton, dextrose and penicillin -- across hospitals in each of the four Latin 
American countries for which data exist.  The poor procurement performance underlying 
the purchases were attributed to gross mismanagement or corruption (Di Tella and 
Savedoff, 2001).   
 
In Colombia, it is estimated that about 11 percent of costs could have been saved if 
accepted public tendering rules had been followed (Giedion, Morales and Acosta, 2001).  
Results from surveys of physicians and nurses in Argentina (Schargrodsky, Mera and 
Weinschelbaum, 2001), Colombia (Giedion, Morales and Acosta, 2001) and Venezuela 
(Jaén and Paravisini, 2001) show that corruption within facilities leads to overpayment of 
suppliers, and that combined with the lack of punishment and the low probability of 
getting caught make it possible.  In short, the lack of enforced rules, procedures and 
accountability effectively allows irregularities in purchasing practices. 
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introduced the prices of procured supplies dropped sharply but rose again once the policy 
was no longer enforced (Schargrodsky, Mera and Weinschelbaum, 2001).  In Colombia 
price variations were statistically significant across purchases of public hospitals, and 
particularly different where they ignored the price lists negotiated and endorsed by a local 
NGO under contract to the government (Giedion, Morales and Acosta, 2001).  
Direct and specific evidence is harder to come by.  However, in Ghana interviews with 
officials and the public suggest that 21% of procurements in government hospitals are 
corrupt, and 18% of the value of contracts is required in kickbacks to public officials 
(World Bank, 2000d).  Petty theft in the aggregate can lead to significant losses, making 
it not so petty.  Anecdotal evidence is abundant, but hard evidence elusive.  Qualitative 
work has unearthed some strong perceptions and knowledge of petty theft providing a 
sense of its importance, and lending credence to allegations of theft. 
 
Figure 4. Comparison of Purchase Price Difference for 
Selected Medical Supplies Across Public Hospitals in 















































Source: Di Tella and Savedoff, 2001
 
 
Petty theft was considered very common in Costa Rican hospitals where 83 percent of 
nurses reported thefts (Di Tella and Savedoff, 2001), and in Venezuela where roughly 
two-thirds of health personnel were aware of stolen materials, equipment or drugs (Jaén 
and Paravisini, 2001).   In Peru, theft by both physicians and nurses was viewed as the 
  24most common form of corruption, with the highest estimated prevalence in Ministry of 
Health hospitals -- 22 percent, double that reported for Social Security hospitals (Alcázar 
and Andrade, 2001).   
The lack of discipline and oversight makes it easy for corrupt officials to report higher 
costs for supplies, food and other goods and to pocket the difference.  Even in developed 
countries, pharmaceuticals and supplies tend to be locked and closely inventoried to track 
supplies and drugs on a continuous basis because theft poses so much of a threat.  Most 
public health systems in developing and transition countries lack the ability to limit 
access to drug supplies and the infrastructure to control access, although there are some 
exceptions.  The absence of information systems for supplies and drugs, and an inability 
to sanction (or hold accountable) abusing staff makes control of theft particularly 
challenging. 
 
D.  Flow of Funds 
 
Subsidized health care is meant to rely on public funding and minimally, if at all, on 
patients.  In many places, bureaucratic problems, corruption and mismanagement lead to 
inadequate public funds at the point of service and the informal charging of patients 
compensates for inadequate salaries and gaps in discretionary budgets.  At the same time 
informal charging may have serious equity implications undermining the objectives of 
subsidies.  
 
Leakage of Public Funds.  Whether public resources for staff and other inputs reach the 
front line -- the clinics and hospitals that deliver the services to the population – is critical 
to a functioning health system.  The World Bank has pioneered efforts to measure the 
extent of leakage, that is, the amount of the line ministries’ budgets that reaches the 
intended communities and the schools, clinics and hospitals funded through national 
transfers.  These public expenditure tracking studies (PETS) simply follow the flow of 
funds through the labyrinth of government bureaucracy to determine if funds reach each 
of the designated levels.   
First applied in education, PETS identified key problems of effective public management.  
In Uganda, 87 percent of funds never reached the schools (Dehn, Reinikka and Svensson, 
2003).  In Zambia it was 60 percent.  Table 3 summarizes available evidence for the 
health sector in four countries:  Ghana, Peru, Tanzania and Uganda where leakage is 70 
percent or higher in all but Tanzania.  High leakage means inadequate funding for non-
salary spending, which makes the job of service delivery exceedingly difficult and 
necessarily imposes on patients to finance “free” health care through financial or in-kind 
contributions.  In Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Senegal, there is evidence of 
leakage but neither the levels nor the sources of the problem have been determined.  
Leakages are a reflection of delays and bottlenecks in budget execution and supply 
management, poor record keeping and underutilization of audits, as well as incompetence 
and criminal acts.  Incomplete and error riddled records complicate efforts to track 
financial flows, which is why so few countries have comparable data despite the number 
of country studies undertaken.   
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COUNTRY YEAR  LEAKAGE 
RATE 
TYPE OF EXPENDITURE 
Ghana 2000 
 
80% Non-salary  budget 
Peru 2001 
 
71  “Glass of Milk” Program 
Tanzania 1999 
 
40 Non-salary  budget 
Uganda 2000 
 
70  Drugs and supplies 
   Source: Lindelow, Kushnarova, and Kaiser, 2005 
 
In the case of education in Uganda, informing the public of expected school transfers and 
reporting receipt of funds to the community led to dramatic increases in non-salary 
budgets.  Effectively the community monitored and pressured local officials to make sure 
that funds were applied as intended (Reinikka and Svensson, 2004). 
Informal Payments.  Informal payments can be defined as “payments to individual and 
institutional providers, in kind or in cash, that are made outside official payment channels 
or are purchases meant to be covered by the health care system.  This encompasses 
‘envelope’ payments to physicians and ‘contributions’ to hospitals as well as the value of 
medical supplies purchased by patients and drugs obtained from private pharmacies but 
intended to be part of government-financed health care services.” (Lewis, 2000, 2002).  
More specifically they are under-the-table payments to doctors, nurses and other medical 
staff for jumping the queue, receiving better or more care, obtaining drugs, or just simply 
for any care at all.     
 
Informal payments create a parallel market for services within public health care systems, 
and, like the informal sector, informal payments are typically illegal and unreported.  
They can be considered a form of corruption, but may just be symptomatic of bad 
management.  While only recently defined and discussed, what emerges from the data is, 
surprisingly, how widespread informal payments have become. 
 
A major challenge is differentiating informal and gratitude payments given the official 
co-payment, bribes and gifts that patients pay. Where all fees have been banned any 
payment by households is clearly unofficial, but in many countries formal fees exist, 
blurring the dichotomy.  It then becomes the level of payment, the nature of the 
transaction and its timing that become relevant for distinguishing the nature of the 
payment.  For example, in Kyrgyz Republic in 2001 95 percent of those who paid for 
services did not receive a receipt while only 3 percent reported giving a gift to the health 
personnel and the time of service (Falkingham, 2002).  A Bolivia study showed that 
perception of corruption was associated with the size of informal payment with a 
significant coefficient of .34 (Gatti, Gray-Molina and Klugman, 2004). 
 
Ex post transactions are particularly problematic because post-service gratitude gestures 
are common and often expected.  Where providers insist on direct pre-payment without 
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payments for specific tasks, or refuse basic services without a “tip” (e.g., such as moving 
patients from room to room, or giving injections) informality of payment is likely. 
 
Figure 5 summarizes the frequency of informal payments to public health care workers 
among users of health services based on survey data from various sources.  The 
frequency range is enormous from 3 percent in Peru to 96 percent in Pakistan.  
Regionally South Asia stands out for its heavy reliance on informal payments.  East 
Asian experience is split between Thailand and Indonesia with low levels and the former 
Communist countries, with Cambodia at 55 percent and a dated estimate for Vietnam at 
81 percent.  The proportions for Latin America and Eastern Europe have a wide 
distribution with low levels in some countries and among the highest in others, making 
generalizations meaningless. Recent evidence from smaller samples in Africa suggests 
that informal payments of various kinds are common in Uganda (McPake et al., 1999), 
Mozambique (Lindelow, Ward and Zorzi, 2004) and Ethiopia (Lindelow, Serneels and 
Lemma, 2003).  In all three, patients pay public providers directly for consultations and 
drugs over and above any formal charges. 
 
Data sources vary with much of the information coming from either household surveys or 
governance and corruption studies, although some, like Bolivia (2002), Moldova, 
Kazakhstan (1999) and Poland used dedicated health facility exit surveys
5, and Albania 
(2002), Bolivia (2001) and China used province level surveys, and the India data are from 
a district in Rajastan.  Where both large household surveys and smaller studies exist for 
the same country, the latter always shows higher informal payments.  Kazakhstan 
exhibits dramatically higher payments in the 2002 survey over the 2001 LSMS.  
Albania’s overall LSMS estimate in 1996 was 22 percent, but jumped to 28 and 60 
percent, respectively, for outpatient and inpatient care in the smaller 2001 survey.   
Whether this is due to the greater attention to the issue with dedicated surveys and 
smaller samples  that allow drilling down sufficiently to obtain reliable information on a 
sensitive subject, or other factors it suggests that some of the broader surveys 
underestimate the extent of patient payments. 
 
Low levels of informal payments in Peru, Paraguay, Thailand and Kosovo may reflect the 
existence of and reliance on private sector alternatives that require significant out-of-
pocket payments where consumers tend to have more influence on performance. The 
Czech Republic appears odd given the rest of ECA but consistent with other findings.   
Public providers with a monopoly position are in a stronger position to charge patients 
extra for their services.   
 
Kosovars have not had access to public health care for decades and have financed care 
out of pocket to private providers.  Thais too rely on the private sector for some of their 
                                                 
5 The Bolivia survey collected data from 2888 women in 106 municipalities; the Moldova survey consisted 
of 390 interviews with physicians, nurses and patients in the capital, Chisinau, and two provinces; the 
Albanian household survey surveyed 3 provinces; the Poland survey was only of Gdansk and Wroclaw 
cities; and, the Kazakh hospital survey interviewed 1508 discharged patients from three Almaty City 
hospitals. 
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question that explanation since Colombia has a large private health  system not too 
different from Peru’s.  The differences may reflect different degrees of oversight in  
public clinics and hospitals, but more in-depth work would be necessary to reach a firm 
conclusion since the approach to measuring informal payments varies across countries.      
 
Figure 5. Proportion who make Informal 
Payments Among Users of Health Services, 
Selected Countries






























Source: See Source Appendix I
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Figure 6 extends the informal payment distribution to encompass differences in 
outpatient and inpatient payments and includes some countries from Figure 5.  With the 
exception of Bulgaria, inpatient care is more likely to be financed via informal payments, 
and often the disparity between the two types of services is dramatic, as is the case with 
Bangladesh, Tajikistan, Armenia and Albania.  Evidence for four Eastern European 
countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania) reveals that formal payment 
are associated with primary and outpatient specialist care and informal payments with 
surgery and inpatient services (Belli, 2002).  Households either feel the need to pay for 
hospitalizations or providers don’t give them a choice insisting on payment if services are 
to be rendered.   
 
Perception surveys of providers or citizens offer additional insights.  In Costa Rica 85 
percent of medical staffs indicated that under-the-table payments to physicians were 
common, and half of patients said they made payments in public facilities roughly 
equivalent to 50 percent of a private sector consultation.  In Bolivia the incidence of 
informal payments was significantly correlated with perceptions of corruption in specific 
public hospitals, and 40 percent of interviewed patients acknowledged making illicit 
payments for care (Gray-Molina et. al, 2001), this is similar to the results of a household 
survey in 106 Bolivian municipalities reportedly that 45 percent of patients paid 
informally (Chakraborty et al, 2002).  Interestingly, national surveys for Bolivia show 
that over 60 percent of those interviewed considered health to be corrupt. 
 
A comparative study in five South Asian countries (Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan 
and Sri Lanka) found that in all but Sri Lanka most payments were ex ante demands from 
providers.  Bribes are required in all five countries for admission to the hospital, to obtain 
a bed, and to receive subsidized medications (Thampi, 2002).  In Bangalore, India citizen 
feedback surveys revealed that informal payments were made to ensure proper treatment, 
but they were typically demanded by providers and 51 percent of those interviewed 
indicated they had paid bribes in government hospitals and 89 percent in hospitals in 
small cities, but they also paid informally in the private hospitals (24%).  More  
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dramatically, bribes were paid to nurses in maternity homes so mothers could see their 
infants (Gopakumar, 1998).  In Albania among the 60 percent of patients who received 
care 43 percent said the gift was requested (World Bank, 2003a).  Using focus groups of 
patients and providers Shahriari, Belli and Lewis (2001) explain the virtual market for 
publicly provided care in Poland.  Informal payments have become the way to obtain the 
services of specific physicians, with pricing reflecting reputation and demand.  It is an 
implicit form of insurance for possible future needs, and prices are commonly known.  
Thus the process of negotiation and payment for health services may be informal but it 
has become a very sophisticated market in Poland. 
 
The motivations of health staff and patients in relying on under the table payments are 
strong.  Physicians argue that low pay, irregular salary payments, lack of government 
attention and the need to keep services going requires drastic action, and patient 
contributions offer the only source of funds to fill the gap (Bloom Han and Li, 2001; 
Belli, Shahriari, Lewis, 2001; Lindelow, Serneels and Lemma, 2003; Kutzin et al., 2003).  
Patients on the other hand also see low pay as an impetus to contribute, but traditions of 
gratitude as well as concerns for some future need also play a role.   
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In Ethiopia feedback from policymakers, experts and health workers revealed that 
inappropriate payments are rife in the health sector.  Patients typically must pay for every 
service and each item, from registering to paying bribes for changing bed sheets to drugs 
and supplies (Lindelow, Serneels and Lemma, 2003).  Similar reports of itemized 
charging emerged from qualitative work in Georgia (Belli, Shahriari and Gotzadze, 2004) 
and Poland (Belli, Shahriari and Lewis, 2001) where there too the public system has 
become a fee-for service entity.    Qualitative studies explore this in some depth. 
Consumer confusion about the official or unofficial nature of payments is common.  
Patients pay but they don’t always know why and they often do so at multiple locations 
or for different “services” (Belli, Shahriari and Gotzadze, 2004; Narayan, 2000; 
Killingsworth et al., 1999).    
 
Multivariate analysis sheds further light on some of the underlying motivations for 
informal payment as well as whether patient revenues are well spent.  In Kazakhstan 
Thompson’s (2004) econometric analysis of patients discharged from three hospitals in 
Almaty City concluded that informal payments made in the admission department before 
treatment, and the amount paid subsequently at both admissions and hospital wards 
shortened admission time for surgery.  He found longer lengths of stay associated with 
payments to both the admission department and directly to individual providers on the 
wards, and perceived patient quality increased with the amount paid informally.  These 
results confirm the assumption that patients pay to receive more attentive and “higher 
quality” care as they perceive it.  Longer lengths of stay do not necessarily mean better 
clinical care, but shorter waits, longer hospital stays and better treatment by medical staff 
tend to be valued by patients.  In Kazakhstan paying ensures that health care meets the 
demands and perceived needs of patients. 
 
Of concern is the relative cost of the services to patients, and numerous studies point out 
the impact on the poor.  Figure 7 summarizes the available data showing the average cost 
of an outpatient visit or hospital admission as a percent of half monthly income, roughly 
equivalent to median income (source).  The level of inpatient payments far exceeds the 
amounts paid out for outpatient services and numerous studies document the extent of 
hardship some households face in meeting these costs.  Inpatient costs can exceed annual 
family income forcing the sale of assets or the accumulation of debt in order to afford 
care (Lewis 2000, 2002; Falkingham 2002, 2004; Killingsworth et al., 1999).  Selected 
studies in China of “red packages” paid to providers report that payments average 
between 140-320 yuan per hospital visit  (US$16-36), with referral hospitals averaging 
400 yuan (US$44), roughly 90 percent of half monthly income (Bloom, Han and Li, 
2001). 
 
Two studies in Albania showed different aspects of the informal payment issue.  The 
analysis of a three province survey showed that rural residents were more likely to pay 
for services though they paid about the same as those in other income brackets when they 
did pay, and income had no effect on the probability of having to pay (Hotchkiss et al., 
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Sources: World Bank LSMS; Murrugarra 2003; Falkingham 2000 and 2001; Transparency International 2002 ; 
World Bank 2000b, 2000d, 2001a;  Phongpaichit 2000; Bloom, Han and Li 2001, Banerjee and Duflo (2005).
*Survey of 2000 housholds in three Albanian provinces
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***Percent calculated as average across various studies. Striped bar indicates referral hospitals.
  322005).   Estimates of the price elasticity of small increases in the price of health services 
using a national representative survey found almost no effect, indicating that patients are 
not particularly price sensitive in Albania (World Bank, 2003a). 
 
Exemption for fees offers the potential for husbanding scarce resources for those least 
able to afford health care.  Many systems have instituted such procedures to retain the 
benefits of co-payments without unduly burdening the poor (World Bank, 2004).  
Evidence on effectiveness, however, suggests problems with the approach.  In 
Bangladesh data from interviews and observation in a sample of four hospitals showed 
that 75 percent of the time the lowest income group paid the least amount both officially 
and unofficially.  In the outlier institution the poor paid more than the wealthiest group 
but the same as or less than the middle income patients.  Payments are also standardized 
and routinized with specific time periods for charging during inpatient stays rather than at 
discharge (Killingsworth et al, 1999).   
 
In Rajasthan, India patients regularly pay for “free” outpatient care, though the poorest 
patients pay 40 percent less than the highest income patients, though it should be noted 
that in this part of India everyone is poor it is simply a matter of degree.  On average 7.3 
percent of total household spending goes to paying for health care (Banerjee, Deaton and 
Duflo, 2004).  In Uganda exemptions were extended to the politically powerful and those 
overseeing the local health care program (McPake et al, 1999), a perverse version of 
exemption meant to ensure equal access but in this case subsidizing the better off.  
Central Asia’s experience has not been encouraging either with minimal exemptions for 
lower income patients (Falkingham, 2004). Evidence from Kazakhstan showed that for 
major illnesses the lowest income households spent more than twice their monthly 
income for health care while the wealthiest households spent the equivalent of half their 
monthly income reflecting the lack of exemptions for the poor (Sari, Langenbrunner and 
Lewis, 2000). 
 
Informal payments are much more widespread than commonly thought.  Indeed, donors 
and governments have urged banning user charges in the interests of equity in access to 
health services.  Sweeping removal of a reliable source of revenue for equity reasons 
means that those who can and cannot pay receive free care.  However the strategy could 
simply encourage under-the-table payments from both sets of patients since patients 
already pay and in some cases can afford treatment.  While there is some suggestion from 
Kyrgyz Republic (Kutzin et al, 2003) and Cambodia (Barber, Bonnet and Bekedam, 
2004) that instituting formal fees can serve to curtail informal payments, the impact of 
removing fees has not been assessed.  Anecdotal evidence suggests a rise in informal 
arrangements, but documentation has not confirmed this. 
 
E.  Mismanagement in Health Care Service Delivery 
 
Often irregularities and poor governance simply stem from poor management.  Where 
incentives for strong performance either don’t exist or are undermined by ineffective 
management it is not surprising that productivity and performance suffer.  For example, if 
staff advancement caps after a single promotion, a common pattern in many countries, 
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sector staff even in the face of embezzlement or nonattendance erodes managers’ 
authority and the public sector’s ability to hold staff accountable.  The lack of carrots and 
sticks dis-empowers public management and thwarts efforts at accountability.  
 
Evidence on mismanagement is spotty.  The core issues include human resource 
management and supervision, basic subsystems function (e.g., procurement, drug 
logistics), efficiency of fiduciary transfers, input availability, and satisfaction of the target 
population.   
 
Overall management of health systems, hospitals and clinics typically fall to physicians, 
few of whom have the training or experience necessary to effectively carry out their jobs.  
This poses a major problem in Turkey as they move to reform the health system (World 
Bank, 2003c), and was at the heart of ineffective service delivery in the Dominican 
Republic (La Forgia et al, 2004).  Disincentives to good performance often are due to 
rigid civil service rules that limit promotion and pay differentials that could be used to 
reward superior performance.  At the same time low productivity or outright abuses can 
go unnoticed  (Lewis, LaForgia and Sulvetta. 1992). 
 
Low wages also lead workers to seek additional employment outside government.  In 
Kogi State, Nigeria, 42 percent of the staff had not been paid their salaries for more than 
6 months in the past year (Das Gupta, Gauri and Khemani, 2003), converting staff into 
virtual volunteers and eroding the credibility of the health system.  In addition to the 
Nigeria state, reports from Ethiopia, Mozambique and Uganda (Lindelow, Serneels and 
Lemma, 2003; Lindelow, Ward and Zorzi, 2003; Azfar and Gurgur, 2001) indicated that 
the need to have additional sources of income effectively compromised providers’ ability 
to carry out their public duties on the scale intended.  In qualitative surveys health 
workers said they missed work or cut short their hours to devote time to other economic 
activities.  Another study in Nigeria showed that the greater the lag in paying salaries the 
more likely health workers were to engage in pharmaceutical sales and seek other 
employment in the private sector (Khemani, 2004).  Family survival therefore plays a 
role in absenteeism and low productivity.  
 
Evidence from a number of countries suggests that vague and poorly understood policies, 
uneven recordkeeping and minimal use of such information contribute to poor 
management.  An assessment in Nigeria found a low level of knowledge among Federal 
Ministry of Health (FMOH) staff regarding standard procedures and regulations, and 
current budget allocations.  Moreover, current budgets and expenditures did not 
correspond (World Bank, forthcoming).   In Uganda staff records were inadequate.  At 
the facility level only 56 percent of the staff are to be found in district records, but at the 
district level there were an additional 109 staff (out of a total of 465) who do not show up 
on facility rosters (Lindelow, Reinikka and Svensson, 2003).  In Honduras 2.4 percent of 
staff were “ghost” workers and 5 percent of staff had unilaterally moved to other 
locations (World Bank, 2001f). 
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(Lindelow, Ward and Zorzi, 2004) undermined health care delivery and regular 
availability of inputs.  In Nigeria, existing management information systems were 
deemed ineffective due to complicated and obscure reporting requirements, incomplete 
record keeping and low capacity (World Bank, forthcoming).  Drug management in Costa 
Rica, a well run middle income country, exhibits particular weaknesses in logistics and 
distribution attributed to flawed information systems and inadequate monitoring (Cohen, 
2002).  Each of these represent deficient aspects of recordkeeping that compromise 
efforts at management. 
  
Poor management also appears to signal corruption in some instances. In Bolivia 
multivariate analysis showed a significant association between longer waiting time and 
corruption indicators (Gatti, Gray-Molina and Klugman, 2003), and in the Philippines 
perceptions of corruption in public health services discouraged use of public facilities, 
particularly in poor communities (Azfar and Gurgur, 2001).  Corruption no doubt is 
associated with bad management, the question remains as to whether and how 
management flaws lead to corruption.  
 
This brief review does not do justice to the complexity of the issue, and more attention to 
the problem of incentives and management are warranted.  Although a chronic weakness 
of health systems, management is critical to performance and improved effectiveness.   
Ensuring the availability of funds, hiring and deploying staff, maintaining basic record 
systems, and tracking facility performance are the basic ingredients for improving 
management and overall health care delivery.     
 
 
III.    Policy Options for Promoting Better Governance 
 
Improving governance poses an important challenge to governments in transition and 
developing countries, but there are good examples of things that can be done based on 
actual experiences.  This section is divided by category to summarize the evidence and 
link these lessons to specific agendas.  Accountability and incentives serve as threads 
across the components because they represent the keys to better policy and outcomes.  
 
Key accountability measures include (i) information on performance and impact, (ii) the 
ability to audit, (iii) the authority to reward performance, and discipline, transfer and 
terminate employees who engage in abuses; and (iv) answering to stakeholders on the 
performance of public services.  Accountability tends to be absent due in part to 
measurement problems but also to minimal management, oversight or evaluation of 
performance.  The high demand from patients for diagnosis and care when they fall ill, 
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The health system that delivers health care is only as good as its management.  This 
section focuses on government initiatives and management tools that can raise 
effectiveness and performance. 
 
Adequate incentives for health professionals lie more in the structure of the health care 
system and its financing than in limited actions that fix existing arrangements.  
Fundamentally money needs to follow patients at least in terms of tying medical staff 
time to specific patients.  Paying providers whether they see (or are assigned) patients or 
not, and compensating under and over-performance equally is both unfair and unlikely to 
build the trust needed in a public health system.  How that is accomplished is the 
challenge, and there are options.   
 
The exception to money following patients may be capitated payments where physicians 
receive a fixed prospective payment for each patient and extends services as needed.  It 
has been shown to be highly effective at providing the necessary incentives for providers, 
but typically is combined with clear management and oversight to ensure accountability.  
Physicians who don’t see patients under capitation are managed to assure that they 
comply with requirements of contracts, so in the end money does follow patients.   
 
Adjustments to pay and benefits, clear criteria for hiring and promotion, defined 
discipline for misconduct and adequate training to equip workers with needed skills foster 
a functioning health system.  How providers are paid has dramatic effects on 
performance, as evidence from the OECD countries attests.  Payment methods are the 
cornerstone of incentives for productivity and performance and increasingly developed 
countries have sought alternatives or at least complementary means to reward 
performance and productivity.   
 
In most developing countries physician compensation remains salary based.  A review of 
the limited literature on the effect of salary earnings on physician clinical behavior across 
the OECD concluded that physicians whose earnings are based on salary rather than fee-
for-service, bonus payments or capitation showed lower productivity, lower levels of care 
and higher wound rates from surgery. However, salaried doctors facilitated cost control, a 
major concern in OECD health systems (Gosden, Pedersen and Torgerson, 1999).   
 
Low wages represent one area of potential temptation for corruption.  Where earnings are 
low individuals have second and third jobs, but they also perceive that low wages entitle 
them to demand contributions from patients.  Civil service reform is often required to 
address egregious structural problems related to postings, promotion and pay, but the 
health sector can also serve as a pilot to launch improvements that stimulate better 
performance.  Alternatively experimentation with other payment arrangements may prove 
more effective. 
 
In Bolivia corruption was lower where management was stronger and some form of 
oversight of staff existed, in this case, frequent written evaluations of performance, key 
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education, inspectors were associated with lower absenteeism in some cases, and it may 
apply in health care.  However, business effectiveness studies in the FSU show how 
inspectors can undermine the system through bribes to certify acceptable performance, so 
it is important to ensure that such arrangements are working as intended if they are 
adopted. 
 
In a recent experiment, Leonard (2005) assesses the importance of training and incentives 
in determining physician performance in Tanzania across a sample of public and private 
providers.  He concludes that while ability is important, institutional incentives, 
particularly the ability to hire and fire staff, are far more powerful than education or 
experience in explaining the quality of care provided patients, offering an empirical basis 
for the priority of putting in place incentives to foster improvements in health care. 
 
A fundamental initiative is the establishment of clear procurement and contracting 
rules.  Evidence for Argentina and Colombia shows a potential role for effective 
oversight as discussed.  To effectively achieve such results requires existence of clear 
rules, effective oversight to detect problems, enforcement of rules, and rewards and 
punishments for good and unacceptable behavior, respectively.  The lack of minimal 
managerial order and oversight are fundamental weaknesses in many public health 
systems which permit such abuses.  In fairness, however, battling these kinds of problems 
persist in even the wealthiest countries and relentless effort are required to control corrupt 
practices.   
 
In the Philippines multivariate analysis found that the frequency of audit by central 
government and autonomy of local government increased immunization coverage, 
suggesting that local governments can benefit from authority, and auditing will further 
encourage responsible public performance (Azfar and Gurgur, 2001).  In Madagascar,  
sanctions for misuse of funds led to systematic following of financial procedures.  Most 
important among sanctions was criticism from supervisors and transfer to less desirable 
locations.  Though the effect of accountability is diluted by the fact that the most 
common reasons for transfer is displeasing local officials without discussion or vetting of 
the merits of the transfer, frequent audits of financial records combined with 
consequences for staff were successful in improving financing management, a 
cornerstone of government effectiveness (Brinkerhoff, 2005). 
 
The nature of accountability and how to structure incentives is not apparent from the 
evidence assembled here.  Ostensible community oversight has been assessed in 
Bolivia, Madagascar, the Philippines, Uganda.  The centralized hiring, promotion and 
deployment of public health workers in all countries effectively neutralizes the role of 
local supervision.  If the consequences of absenteeism, taking of bribes and stealing of 
drugs are beyond the authority of local boards or community oversight bodies then those 
institutions may bring the community together but they will have no influence over the 
centrally managed health staffs, or service delivery responsiveness and access.   
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they are effective.  In Jigawa state in Nigeria hospital management committees meant to 
oversee and advise hospital managers rarely met, were unclear on their responsibilities, 
and had little involvement with strategic planning, targeting or budget control (World 
Bank, forthcoming).  In Madagascar, the fact that local committees were powerless 
beyond moral suasion led providers to ignore their hollow authority and instead respond 
to supervisors who had a say in their destiny (Brinkerhoff, 2005).  To be effective 
community leaders need authority, and at the same time they need to be accountable to 
the local citizenry. 
 
Local control where it goes beyond simply oversight holds promise.  Under the 
“Bamako Initiative” that gave communities in selected African countries control over 
health facilities in exchange for sharing the financing burden showed impressive health 
status improvements in at least three countries.  In Ceara, Brazil the state instituted a 
health worker outreach program with hired health outreach workers under contract to the 
state, and handed responsibility for supervision to municipalities.  Local control led to 
better health in the communities covered by the new state program (sources).  In Bolivia 
corruption was lower where local organizing groups were active (Gatti, Gray-Molina and 
Klugman, 2003).  In contrast local control proved ineffective in Nigeria, Madagascar and 
Uganda (World Bank, forthcoming; McPake et al, 1999; Brinkerhoff, 2005) leaving the 
issue unresolved, but more experimentation and systematic evaluations can help address 
this. 
 
Strategies to control informal payments entail both finding alternative sources of 
funding and better management.  Raising official fees as a substitute for under-the-table 
payments showed positive effects on patient payment and utilization in two pilot 
programs: in two regions in the Kyrgyz Republic, and a major referral hospital in 
Cambodia.  In Kyrgyz Republic formal fees reduced informal charges as confirmed by 
both multivariate analysis and data which showed the proportion of patients making 
direct payments to providers declined from 60 percent to 38 percent while informal 
payments for the country as a whole rose to 70 percent.  In-kind spending by patients for 
food and linens in the pilot regions with formal fees remained constant but spending for 
drugs and medical supplies declined by over 50 percent though there was no change in 
the country as a whole.  That combined with insurance payments helped to make health 
care more affordable and quelled under-the-table payments (Kutzin et al, 2003).    
 
In Cambodia reorganization of hospital staffing combined with a transparent official fee 
policy, clearly designated exemptions, and retained fee revenue that supplemented 
physician salaries at levels comparable to those earned under the informal arrangements 
led to more reliable pricing, stable revenue and higher demand.  Focus groups identified 
the deterrent of informal payments to health service use, and the subsequent predictability 
and equity adjustments improved access without compromising utilization or hospital 
revenue, the latter a critical component of compensation given salary levels (Barber, 
Bonnet and Bekedam, 2004). Two instances do not allow sweeping conclusions, but the 
fact that substituting legal for illegal payments and allowing the points of service to retain 
revenues proved effective suggests that it is a strategy worth pursuing further 
  38 
Addressing some of the incentives behind informal payments provide options for reform.  
Some alternative policies include: standardizing quality and access (e.g., waiting time), 
allowing and promoting alternative financing mechanisms through the private sector 
(e.g., private insurance arrangements), and, within the public sector, balancing the 
number of staff and resources so as to have fewer positions with higher pay.  As 
discussed elsewhere higher pay will not necessarily address corruption by itself, but 
paying wages that are appropriate to existing labor market conditions,  prohibiting side 
payments and holding providers accountable could together encourage more transparent 
and fair transactions, and offer incentives for better provider performance.  Although it is 
expensive for countries to raise wages in public health care services, a reform that 
regularizes and improves pay has the potential to raise productivity.  Higher productivity, 
in turn, would make it possible to provide the same amount of services or more, with 
fewer workers, thereby offsetting some of the expected increase in the total wage bill. In 
addition, greater transparency in all fiduciary functions would improve fairness and 
bolster effectiveness. 
 
In Venezuela, a study of public hospitals found that theft and unjustified absences 
declined with greater accountability, although the rate of approved absences rose, so 
reforms can be effective but management objectives can sometimes be too narrowly 
defined (Jaen and Paravinski, 2001).  The issue should not be absences per se but 
performance and both management and accountability mechanism need to focus on these. 
 
Having government contract out services can often improve performance of publicly 
subsidized services, partly because holding contractors accountable is far easier than 
doing so with public workers.  Often government has few incentives to offer public 
servants given rigidity in most civil service rules, but retains leverage over contractors.  
Nonetheless contracting out is far from a panacea as it means developing regulatory 
capacity which varies from the standard tasks of providers and managers who operate 
points of service.  Experience in Haiti (Eichler, Auzilia and Pollock, 2001), Cambodia 
(World Bank, 2004) and Central America (La Forgia, 2005) suggest that contracting out 
can work even in the lowest income environments, the challenge is ensuring continued 
oversight and accountability of contractors.  To date only the four Central American 
cases have a track record across elections. 
 
Consumer satisfaction surveys help build accountability.  Exit surveys, mini-household 
surveys or focus groups to elicit responses help gauge the strengths and weaknesses of 
public programs.  Including these in annual reporting up the chain of command, and 
encouraging points of service to use these for management purposes would provide 
benchmarks for making public services more responsive, and bolstering their impact and 
effectiveness.   
 
B. Controlling  Corruption 
 
This paper has described the wide range of irregularities that characterize health care 
services in developing countries and suggests that corruption flourishes where there are 
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options discussed here have a track record, but the policy context and actions taken by 
officials provide the needed detail that explains why certain policies were found 
effective.  Policies themselves are necessary but not sufficient as enforcement is equally 
important. 
 
Game results from an experiment in Ethiopia used to determine temptation for corruption 
concluded that higher pay curtails the level of corruption, but only slightly, and that 
public servants appear to expropriate fewer resources when observability is higher, 
indicating that better oversight and exposing of inappropriate behavior can have a 
dampening effect on corruption (Barr, Lindelow and Serneels, 2004).   In short, the 
potential for getting caught offers a strong disincentive for corrupt behavior. 
 
Corruption in the health sector is unlikely to be an isolated public service failure.  
Addressing irregularities across the functions of the sector – construction, procurement 
and distribution of drugs and supplies, deployment of underpaid staff, under-the-table 
payments – requires an integrated, mutually reinforcing anti-corruption strategy with 
strong political backing and a willingness to take a position and follow through.  Indeed, 
it may well require a government-wide anti-corruption agenda, as Poland has undertaken. 
Even there it isn’t enough to remove informal charges as the studies discussed here 
indicate.   Making clean government a priority allows irregularities to be identified and 
addressed, which bolsters efforts in the sector to put in place effective oversight and 
detection, and endorses disciplining corrupt practices once detected.  Without the 
willingness to act on identified corruption countries are unlikely to be able to control such 
practices.   
 
Higher salaries for public sector workers are frequently proposed as a way to curb 
corruption, but the evidence is complicated and not straightforward.  Moreover, as 
discussed above, there may be better means of compensating health professionals.  In a 
study of the effect of civil service pay on corruption using cross-country regression and 
controlling for a wide array of factors, showed that wage levels could affect corruption 
but must rise dramatically to seriously reduce corrupt behavior (Van Rijkeghem and 
Weder, 2001).  Although challenged on their corruption measures, Rauch and Evans 
(2000) find no effect on corruption of higher public sector wages, and instead propose 
that employment security, recruitment and promotion criteria, and management are of 
greater importance than salary increases.  A study in Venezuela found a perverse effect 
with higher wages correlating with more corruption.  Jaen and Paravinski (2001) interpret 
this as corrupt wage earners capturing wage setting through either influence or bribes.  In 
sum, despite the view that salary adjustments will solve corruption the evidence suggests 
that while wage levels may play a role in controlling corruption it is not guaranteed and 
other changes need to accompany higher earnings.   
 
An issue is whether the necessary increases required to eradicate corruption are 
affordable and realistic for most low income countries.  Some increases may be 
warranted but it would also mean staff reductions to accommodate higher pay.  These are 
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and curb corruption. 
 
The absence of basic information, regular audits and monitoring evidence define an 
environment that invites misconduct.  As Colombia implemented Law 100 reforming its 
health care system it unearthed extensive corruption and mismanagement in reporting and 
record keeping in public programs.  In response the Ministry of Health set up a 
nationwide database for data matching and payment controls to identify and correct 
abuses that were resulting in paying “ghost” workers, among other problems.  That 
combined with a multimedia campaign informing citizens of their rights and obligations 
under the newly reformed system provided a segue-way into better oversight and 
involvement of citizens (Soto, 2002). 
 
Drug procurement poses multiple challenges and Chile’s experience is instructive in 
how to institute reforms that serve multiple objectives.  Chile’s drug and medical supply 
system run by the government, CENEBAST, was plagued with poor management, 
frequent stock outs and overstocks of other medicines. The reform was built around a 
shift from a rules-based system to one grounded in transparency and good incentive 
structures.  Its main components were:  (1) introducing electronic bidding for 
pharmaceuticals; (2) reform of CENEBAST to change its mandate to procurement agent 
for hospitals and other providers who define drug priorities; and (3) information 
dissemination that let it be known that pharmaceutical procurement would be under 
scrutiny.  An important element of the institutional reform was allowing other agencies 
and the private sector to purchase, store and transport drugs, removing CENEBAST’s 
monopoly position.   
 
The reform reduced information asymmetries between providers and the procurers of 
pharmaceuticals. and produced clear and fair rules resulting in bids from a broader 
spectrum of companies and lower prices for government hospitals and clinics.  Overall in 
1997, US$ 4 million was saved just in pharmaceutical purchases (Cohen and Montoya, 
2001).   
 
Nigeria has taken an aggressive stance on the issue and has rooted out considerable 
illegal manufacturing, identified substandard importation, recalled all “repackaged” 
drugs, and ensured that drugs meet a basic standard of potency, labels are clear and 
correct, distribution is achieved through legal channels and oversight of provision, storing 
and handling are systematically regulated.  Evidence from elsewhere, however, is scarce 
as this is an area where little action has taken place at the country level and/ or these have 
not been evaluated.  Middle income countries, like Costa Rica, tend to deal with the 
problem more aggressively (Cohen, 2002), but regulation remains inadequate given the 
ease and lucrative nature of drug corruption. 
More information to citizens about resource flows from central and local governments 
and clarity on the roles and responsibilities of local authorities. Though it requires better 
data on performance, tying local outputs and resource allocations from central 
government (conditional resource transfers) offers a structure to undermine corruption 
and improve service delivery.  Where citizens are informed and empowered to oversee 
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the latter, citizens will be far less likely to view involvement as worthwhile.   
 
Citizen report cards offer another possible means of engaging citizens in oversight to 
improve the quality and integrity of public services.  Pioneered in public services 
generally, report cards have not yet been assessed as a means of improving health 
services, but through investigative studies they equip citizens with information on the 
shortcomings or failures of health services.  Use of press reports based on the studies 
provides both evidence (rather than anecdotes) as well as a public forum for debate, 
which together help localities identify where change is needed (Gopakumar, 1998; World 
Bank 2004).  Like information more generally, having authority to take action is the sine 
qua non of effectiveness in report card use. 
 
C. Voice   
 
Although not strongly associated with health outcomes, voice captures citizens’ ability to 
get information, challenge government and ensure that services meet their needs.  The 
record is mixed on the effectiveness of voice in improving service delivery, but some 
useful lessons emerge. 
 
Information is necessary but not sufficient for citizens’ to be empowered. Without the 
information citizen action can only be random stabs at perceived problems.  Information 
allows concerted action.  In Uganda informing citizens of fiscal transfers from the central 
government by posting budget receipts on school doors and announcing them in the local 
press led to significantly higher receipts, a more informed public and a better financed 
school system (Reinikka and Svensson, 2004).  Similar initiatives would apply in health 
since local health districts are financed through central allocations.  In Colombia regular 
press reports on procurement regularities reduced overpayment by almost 200 percent. 
Despite the scope of these findings, conclusions are tentative given the small number of 
cases, but these suggest promising directions.  
 
The evidence on the role of local voting is uneven.  It appears to have a minimal if any 
effect on corruption at the local level, though the number of studies is small and therefore 
not necessarily representative of the developing world.  In Bolivia no association was 
found between perceived corruption and voter turnout, participation of citizens in cultural 
and religious associations (a proxy for social capital) or the number of NGOs, the 
institutions that are meant to represent citizen voice in municipal budget councils (Gatti, 
Gray-Molina and Klugman, 2003). 
 
In the Philippines and Uganda surveys showed that despite high election turnouts for both 
local and national elections voter numbers were unrelated to corruption levels, and 
electoral preferences in both countries were shaped by other factors.  A multivariate 
analysis of the Philippine data showed that low levels of corruption (as measured by an 
index of household and public official responses) were correlated with voting in local 
elections and reading national newspapers.  Moreover, in both countries civic activities 
were common, suggesting that citizens remain active in government despite a corrupt 
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corruption (Azfar, Kahkonen and Meagher, 2001).   Other factors clearly have a stronger 
influence on voter choices. 
 
These results lead to the tentative conclusion that voice can take many forms and none by 
itself will necessarily lead to the effective control of corruption.  However,  the 
expression of voice via the press or direct community involvement appear to be more 
powerful tools than voting in influencing public performance.  Public service delivery 
does not affect voting patterns or candidate selection sufficiently.  Voting may be too 
blunt of an indicator, one that captures a range of interests of constituents.  Health will 
only predominate if it is the pressing issue of the moment.  Otherwise other concerns 
drive voter preferences.  Some of this may be due to entrenched corruption where 
localities regardless of their oversight simply do not have enough clout to influence 
public sector behavior.  Where hiring and promotion remain centralized, local voice will 
have less effect in any case.  Popularity of candidates, other factors that appeal to voters 
and insufficient evidence on things like corruption no doubt play a role, but it is difficult 
to be definitive given the paltry evidence and the complexity of the issue. 
 
Community oversight can work but it doesn’t always.  In Boliiva corruption is lower 
where local oversight groups are active “suggesting that bottom-up accountability can be 
effective in keeping corruption in check” (Gatti, Gray-Molina and Klugman, 2004).  In 
contrast, Uganda’s Health Management Committees expropriated drugs and supplies 
providing virtually no oversight or support to local service delivery (McPake et al, 1999), 
and in Nigeria village development committees and PHC Management Committees had 
little impact on health care performance largely due to their lack of authority (World 
Bank, forthcoming). 
 
Efforts by a local NGO in Kenya attempted to empower communities to monitor teacher 
attendance using both reports to the school hierarchy on performance and community 
awarded prizes to the best performing teacher.  Neither served to improve attendance, 
despite the active participation of communities.  In contrast, an NGO experiment in India 
using cameras to record teacher attendance, which are tied to compensation bonuses 
resulted in a dramatic improvement in delinquent behavior (Banerjee and Duflo, 2004).  
It may be that voice has less weight in influencing behavior than more remunerative 
approaches combined with air tight monitoring.  As cellular phones become cheaper and 
more functional in rural areas photos sent electronically offer another possible alternative 
means of monitoring progress at the local level. 
 
While voice matters in many service delivery instances, its role in health seems to be less 
straightforward.  The specialized nature of medicine, the heterogeneous products of the 
sector and the status of physicians in most societies complicates oversight by 
communities, and voting is a relatively blunt instrument for influencing the quality and 
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The review of country evidence and the examination of the cross-country factors that 
influence performance (and to some extent outcomes) in health care suggest that 
governance plays an important role.   If the health system is not governed well, health 
workers are absent, patients pay illegal fees, and basic inputs are stolen without any 
consequences for those who mismanage or corrupt the system, performance of health 
services will be poor and population health will suffer.  
 
Many health systems rely on anecdotal evidence to guide policy.  What this paper has 
attempted to do is provide the evidence and outline the major challenges facing health 
systems, dealing with issues typically ignored or unaddressed.  Better country level data 
can help in diagnosing the problem and some of the experiments here may offer possible 
solutions. 
 
The second conclusion is that the returns to health investments may be very low where 
governance is not addressed.  Even with a time lag, investments such as those seen in 
Uganda, Dominican Republic and Ethiopia, countries for which detailed data exist, will 
be unlikely to see high returns from public health spending.  As incomes and education 
rise a shift to private provision may offer higher returns -- something that is already 
underway in the Dominican Republic and India, and something likely to occur in lower 
income countries where governance is poor and the private sector steps in to replace 
public service.  There may be individual returns to the shift, but equity objectives are 
likely to suffer.  Even the poor select to pay significant amounts of disposable income to 
obtain private care, a sad commentary when public services go underutilized.  
 
Third, a countries’ health system is the institution that must be engaged and on the front 
line if governance is to improve government effectiveness and control corruption in the 
sector.  Without bolstering the key institution for the sector it is unlikely that the goals of 
reducing poverty, mortality and morbidity can be achieved.  The evidence here points to 
serious problems of governance across the globe in developing and transition countries, 
which thwart the goals. 
 
Finally, achieving the dramatic and permanent declines in mortality envisioned by the 
Millennium Development Goals is doubtful unless governments shift their attention to 
the institutional factors that affect performance in the health sector.  A dysfunctional 
environment limits the chances that more funding can have an impact, and much of the 
discussion above highlights situations that will not necessarily benefit from large 
increases in funding unless more is done to bolster the capacity of the institutions 
expected to implement the agenda.  Funding without the necessary institutional 
strengthening could lead to perverse results, and assistance for both governance and 
financing will be needed in the health sector. 
 
This review demonstrates that as a first attempt to compile evidence, what is striking is 
the fragmented nature of the evidence is surprisingly fragmented.  It also shows the lack 
of meaningful indicators for cross country comparison, and an absence of critical data at 
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variations in government capacity across income levels.  Reforms in Chile apply to many 
countries, but some will have resources too limited to take on similar reforms.  
Nonetheless, there are elements that can be adopted.  For example, the Chilean drug 
procurement reforms in electronic bidding and institutional reform of drug purchasing 
agencies are well within the purview and capacity of most countries, even if the shifts are 
more modest in scale.  Reforms in any case are entirely country specific given the 
political nature of health care.  What the examples provide here are possible directions, 
all of which will necessarily be adapted to country circumstances. 
 
Even without these important inputs simply having benchmark countries with which to 
compare countries would strengthen the cross country evidence.  Acceptable indicators, 
benchmarks and additional attention to systemic issues would enable more robust 
indicators of overall performance, which in turn would inform policymakers and donors 
of challenges and opportunities for improving health institutions. 
 
What needs addressing is the context and framework under which health systems 
function.  First and foremost is better accountability.  Greater professionalism among 
health staff, effective training and supervision of staff at all levels, routine audits of all 
aspects of fiduciary transactions, improved records and recordkeeping to provide 
systematic data to managers and the bureaucracy, and procedures that can facilitate 
service delivery in a more user friendly fashion all need to be addressed.  Running 
hospitals, clinics and other points of service in the manner of a business or of a ministry 
of finance would be particularly helpful.  The discipline implied and the need to be 
accountable provides the incentives that improve productivity, patient satisfaction and 
performance.  That is where health systems need to move.   
 
Incentives that raise performance – ensuring appropriate, targeted training so health 
professionals are equipped to do their job; linking  pay and performance; reviewing and 
auditing performance; improving recordkeeping; and upgrading logistics for drugs and 
supplies – need to be an integral part of health systems.  Investments in institutions 
require these kinds of initiatives, and donors are in a position to foster such 
improvements with both funding and advice to oil the wheels of progress and support the 
emergence of strong institutions. 
 
Where public services are free or subsidized, with the intention to promote access and 
utilization of vital health services, the abuses related to lack of drugs, staff absences and 
informal payments undermine these objectives as well as the credibility and effectiveness 
of public services more generally.  Without attention to these non-medical issues, clinical 
care quality and equity in access will be lost, leading to both lower health status and 
poorly spent public revenues.  Addressing these public program failures are critical to 
effective government to and functioning health care systems.  Because good governance 
promotes economic growth and effective public services, the health sector cannot afford 
to be sidelined on this agenda.   
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Country Data Year Source
Albania 2002 Vitosha, 2002
Albania  2002 World Bank LSMS Survey
Armenia 2001 Murrugarra & Cnobloch, 2003
Bangladesh   2002 Transparency International, 2002
Bolivia 2001 World Bank 2001b
Bosnia 2000 World  Bank,  2001e
Bosnia 2002 Vitosha,  2002
Bulgaria 2001 LSMS  Survey
Bulgaria 2002 Vitosha,  2002
Cambodia 1999 World  Bank,  2000b
China n.d.  Bloom, Han and Li, 2001
Colombia n.d. Corruption  Survey
Croatia   2002 Vitosha, 2002
Czech Republic 2002 Horthava, Maly', 2002
Georgia 2000 Chawla,  2001
Ghana 1998 Worldbank  LSMS  Survey
Ghana 2000 World  Bank,  2000d
Hungary 2002 Gaal, 2002
India  2002 Transparency International, 2002
Indonesia 2001 Partnership for Governance Reform, 2002
Khazakhstan 2001 World  Bank,  2001c
Kosovo 2000 LSMS  Survey
Krygyz 2001 Falkingham,  2002
Kyrgyz 2001 LSMS Survey
Latvia 1998 Anderson,  1998
Macedonia 2002 Vitosha,  2002
Madagascar 2001 Tranparency International, 2003
Moldova 2000 Carasciuc, 2001
Moldova 2002 Stempovscaia, 2002
Morroco 2001 Tranparency International, 2003
Nepal  2002 Transparency International, 2002
Pakistan  2002 Transparency International, 2002
Paraguay 1999 World Bank, 2000c
Peru 2001 World  Bank,  2001
Poland  1998 Chawla, Berman & Kawiorska, 2001
Romania 2000 World Bank, 2001d
Romania 2002 FBS 
Russia 2002 Shishkin (2003)
Senegal  2001 Tranparency International, 2003
Serbia 2002 Vitosha,  2002
Slovakia 2000 Anderson, 2000
Sri Lanka  2001 Transparency International, 2002
Tajikistan 1999 Falkingham, 2000
Tajikistan 2001 Carasciuc,  2001
Thailand  1999 Phongpaichit, Treerat, Chaiyapong & Baker, 2000
Vietnam 1998 LSMS Survey
Uzkbekistan 2001 FBS   
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